* Qaeda enlists allies to keep up the momentum of attacks
* Attackers are encouraged to strike when and where they can
* Qaeda seeks to render nuclear-armed Pakistan ungovernable
By William Maclean, Security Correspondent LONDON, Jan 26 (Reuters) - Al Qaeda leaders have the will but not the means to direct big attacks on the West and for now must settle for small strikes by allies in a strategy of "a thousand cuts", a U.N. official said.
Richard Barrett, a former senior British intelligence official who now monitors al Qaeda and the Taliban for the United Nations, also said that Pakistan is the arena where al Qaeda central leadership exerts its greatest influence on attacks.
Here is the text of an interview conducted by email.
Q - Will we see a strengthening of a recent trend towards diversification of like-minded groups in 2011?
A - I think that al Qaeda senior leadership encourages 'diversification' because it currently lacks the power and control necessary to orchestrate attacks itself. The leadership has to keep the momentum going and can argue that a campaign of a 1,000 cuts will have an effect.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) could become the operational arm of the senior leadership but its emphasis is on Arabian peninsula, and the senior leadership will probably have to rely on individuals acting where and when they can (in other regions).
It would be a big mistake to think that al Qaeda senior leadership has lost its enthusiasm for organising major attacks.
Q. Will there be diversification, also, in tactics?
A - There is no template. The strategy is clear that individuals and groups should attack what they can when they can by whatever means. The bigger attacks though will be much more focused. The 'printer' bombs (by AQAP in Oct. 2010) have great potential ...There is no doubt that major groups in Afghanistan/Pakistan appreciate the value of British, Germans and others who can travel (when they trust them).
Q - Is al Qaeda in Iraq (ISI) now trying its hand at foreign operations, following in the footsteps of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AQAP and so forth?
A - An interesting question that we too have been asking. Our best guess is that although there have been Iraqis involved in transnational issues...ISI will still focus on Iraq.
A few Iraqis may get caught up in plots elsewhere but not many in proportion to its population. Interestingly, ISI have been a bit more welcoming of foreigners, but probably as potential suicide bombers.
Q - Are Europeans continuing to flow out to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training in substantial numbers?
A - Not in substantial numbers. Germans are probably the biggest group, Austrians, British and Scandinavians in small numbers, often of Pakistani ethnic origin. It is hard to get there and hard to put up with the conditions once there. For example, many of the Turks who have gone have returned to Turkey or Germany and seem quiet.
Q - Is the growth of the affiliates by accident or by design? Surely al Qaeda core wants a big strike in the West and resents the success of the young men in the field?
A - Yes. That's why they want control of the affiliates. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the closest and most promising affiliate, but even AQAP is not under complete control. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a bit of a waste of space as they have not been able to attack in Europe. The statement by (leader Abdelmalek) Droukdel that France would have to negotiate with bin Laden over the hostages says more about the weakness of Droukdel's position than the closeness of AQIM's ties with al Qaeda's senior leadership.
Q - Is AQ core still as relevant as it was globally for brand management/propaganda?
A - I think that it is very relevant to the success of the movement, especially for the coherence of the message and the image of a united front.
Q - Does al Qaeda core leadership appear to have any answer to the pressure it faces in Pakistan from drones, other than the development of the offshoots?
A - I think its current strategy for dealing with the drones is (i) to make Pakistan ungovernable, (ii) to make the drones as unpopular with the people as possible, (iii) to make them a glue that binds the local militants closer to AQ, (iv) to use them to associate AQ with the war in Afghanistan. (v) to use them to create martyrs and heroes. (vi) to use them to demonstrate AQ senior leadership's continued relevance.
Q - What is the significance of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and Saleh bin Abdullah al-Qarawi, the Saudi former colleague of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which claimed a July 2010 attack on the Japanese oil tanker the M Star in the Strait of Hormuz?
A - I have been waiting for the AAB to do something (beyond the Star attack) as I believe they do have potential. Qarawi is competent and the group, though small, appears well-trained.
A problem they have is that they want to focus on Palestine and Lebanon, where it is hard for them to gain traction. I can see that this would make strategic sense for al Qaeda which must be embarrassed at how irrelevant it is to the Arab/Israel issue. I tend to think that Qarawi moves around a fair bit.
Q - Do you think that the most influential role al Qaeda core plays in terms of practical plotting these days is probably in Pakistan, where it gives aid to other groups?
A - I do. But we should not overlook the continued ambition and determination to mount another purely al Qaeda spectacular in the West. (Editing by Angus MacSwan)
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