Kenneth Omeje is a leading expert on corruption and conflict in oil-dominated economies as well as peacebuilding in Africa
NAIROBI (AlertNet) - The ability to manage security, oil revenues and aid money are just some of the challenges facing South Sudan, which will become the world's newest nation on July 9 after voting for independence from the north earlier this year.
In this three part interview, Kenneth Omeje, a professor of International Studies at the United States International University in Nairobi talks to Katy Migiro about the likelihood of a return to all-out conflict in South Sudan, the oil curse and the risk of donor dependency in a region emerging from a two-decade civil war, and led by a government dominated by former southern SPLA/M rebels.
Omeje, a Nigerian academic is a leading expert on corruption and conflict in oil-dominated economies as well as peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Africa. He wrote "War to Peace Transition: Conflict Intervention and Peacebuilding in Liberia" and edited "Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-regional Perspective on Rentier Politics" among other works.
Q. You have said that “there are strong indications that an independent Southern Sudan could be more conflict-ridden than a region kept as a (semi-) autonomous part of Sudan”. Since January’s referendum on independence, 200 people have been killed in clashes between the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its dissident commander George Athor in Jonglei. Another 120 have died in fighting between the SPLA and rebels in Unity State and Upper Nile. What can be done to get rid of these militias?
A. It’s a testament to the fact that the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) process has been very badly done.
Many of these militias have been fighting for many years. The only lifestyle they have had is a lifestyle of violence. People that have been brought up in violence – carrying arms and fighting – have very little skills outside combat skills.
There are indications that many of the beneficiaries (of the DDRR so far) are the dominant Nuer (and) Dinka tribes. Today, they constitute an overwhelming majority of the armed forces. There is disenchantment and dissatisfaction or resentment. Many of the rest of the ethnic groups that also carried arms and fought on their side have retained their militias.
To be more magnanimous and inclusive, it is important to absorb many of these people into the security forces ... the prisons, the immigration and the customs. You have to go into negotiations with all of these groups and train them and absorb them into other security outfits of the state.
Q. The opposition have pulled out of talks on the new constitution, accusing the government of behaving in a dictatorial way by unilaterally appointing additional SPLA members without consultation.Why do you think the government is refusing to give space to the opposition?
A. The SPLA has been a guerilla movement. It’s experiencing a whole range of difficulties transitioning from a guerilla movement to a proper political party and then more so a ruling party in a nascent democracy. They have not been magnanimous in victory. Many of the leaders are still wearing the cap of guerrilla warriors. That could also be an undoing of the state.
The way they have handled this constitution development process doesn’t really give any confidence that they are building an inclusive state. It’s a breach of every principle I know about consensus and confidence-building.
Don’t underestimate the opposition. They have got a strong ethnic basis. And if you put them together, they form a majority even though these are minority ethnic groups relative to the Dinka. If they are able to come together against the state, it will rip the state apart. They cannot afford to start as badly as they have already done.
Q. Do you foresee a return to war?
A. If there is any lesson they should have learned over 50-something years of war, is that war is always a setback and they have had enough setbacks. South Sudan is the most un-developed part of Africa so they cannot afford to return to war. I think they have to be united on that.
Of course, political differences and antagonisms will always be there. But being that they are starting off on a platform of democratic governance, they have to explore democratic ways of resolving their differences without a return to war.
I don’t want to be too optimistic to say you will not have occasional outbreaks of inter-ethnic clashes as they have had over the years. Many African countries have been independent for 50 years and more (and) have continued to have that -- in Kenya, in Nigeria. But a total relapse to war I don’t foresee in South Sudan.
Probably between the north and the south it could occur. But that is likely to be limited to border clashes as opposed to a total return to war.
Professor Kenneth Omeje recently edited the book "Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-regional Perspective on Rentier Politics". Rentier states are those which depend on ‘rent’ or natural resources, such as oil and diamonds, for the bulk of their revenue.
Q. Is the fear of massive corruption in South Sudan real?
A. Sudan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. If you look at the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Sudan is among the bottom seven or so in the whole world. So it (South Sudan) is part of a very corrupt state.
On top of that, (South Sudan) hasn’t got the institutional capacity whatsoever to even manage their own resources, and rentier resources for that matter.
Corruption is real and it is strongly embedded. Government is not going to change. It’s still the same SPLM. I think that the political will to check corruption will remain very low, as it has been over the years, because it’s the same government.
Q. What can be done about it?
A. I think that the international community will have to put pressure on the basis of best practices elsewhere. They have to bring pressure on the government of South Sudan for them to be less tolerant of corruption and for them to clean up. And it also should be made a conditionality for international intervention and aid in various areas.
Q. Would it be useful for South Sudan to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)?
A. It is important to get them to join. First, it would help them to have a good audit of how much (oil revenue) is coming in and they cannot do that without external audit support.
Secondly, it will also put this information in the public domain, such that grassroots elements, civil society (and) opposition parties can have access to this information and bring pressure on the state to account for how they are utilizing the resources.
That can minimize corruption but it cannot stamp it out. I think that it would take a number of years of institution building and strengthening the capacity of the state in various areas for corruption to be significantly reduced.
Q. Do you think they will join EITI?
A. I foresee they will join for international legitimacy. The real issue is what do you do when you join to become compliant? You could join and for the next several years you are still at the same level. You haven’t moved an inch. That is the area where pressure has to be brought.
Q. Is there international political will to persuade South Sudan to comply with EITI?
A. The problem with international development agencies is that many of them, they have got money budgeted for certain issues and for certain areas and they want to get it out as a means of justifying their existence. But I think they have to go beyond that and recognise the need to put pressure on this new state to get its act together and to aim to become a functional state so they don’t relapse into conflict. If the pressure doesn’t come from the international community, I regret to say that a lot of the money they pump in will not achieve much.
Q. Does oil risk becoming a curse for South Sudan?
A. It has been a curse for the larger state of Sudan. The curse is already there. What you have to start aiming at is how do we break this stranglehold so it is not perpetuated?
South Sudan is an agglomeration of polarized ethnic communities. What has united them over the years is the war against the north. And now they are becoming independent, it is likely that their differences will show more because north Sudan is not likely to remain a formidable enemy in the years to come.
The rentier state is inherently conflict prone. What is likely to happen is that there could be an intensification of competition for rentier resources among the elite and they are already polarized, split into various parties formed along ethnic lines.
Even within the ruling party, you have a possible intensification of competition and rivalry for amassing and acquisition and embezzlement of rentier resources. All of this I foresee. I’m not too optimistic about this state and its capacity to fight rentier corruption. It’s there already. The pressure has to come from the international community and they have to get it right.
Q. What is the most likely scenario for South Sudan and donors after independence?
A. The worst case scenario would be the orthodox, conventional, way of many post-conflict states - just cry out to the international community and invite donors in. This is something that I am strongly opposed to. Yes, post-conflict countries need humanitarian intervention. They need relief (and) aid support in various areas. But they also need to be strategic and systematic about it.
If you throw your doors open, the international community (and) development agencies will come with whatever they want to do. Many of them can also be very fraudulent. They can come in and do very little and they exaggerate it. And they will claim they have spent millions to help the country but they probably haven’t done that.
Secondly, most of them would come in and concentrate their efforts and their activities in the large developed cities, the most convenient places they want to be. They will roll out their activities there and when the time is up, they wind up. In the end, the country wouldn’t have benefited much.
Q. Have you seen this happen in other post-conflict African states?
A. Most of the projects in Liberia were concentrated in (the capital) Monrovia, to the neglect of other parts of the country, a lot of which are inaccessible remote villages and towns.
The focus of the projects was on sensitisation of various sorts ... democratic participation, truth and national reconciliation, sexual violence against women including rape and issues of HIV/AIDS and safe sex.
Many other projects were focused on rehabilitation of orphans and children abandoned by war, tracing of missing persons and their reintegration to their families and, to a lesser extent, rehabilitation of former child soldiers.
The projects led by U.N. agencies, international financial institutions and state parties like the U.S. government were mostly focused on security sector reforms, democratic reforms, market reforms, judicial service reforms ... and rebuilding the governance infrastructure and capacity of the state.
In general, public infrastructures -- roads, power, water, health care, and education to a lesser extent -- were all neglected. Perhaps the worst of all the neglected sectors is agriculture which badly affected the capacity of the country to feed its people and create jobs for the large number of unskilled young people.
Monrovia remains relatively overpopulated largely because there is virtually no development activity and opportunities in the rest of the country.
Q. What is the solution?
A. They (the government of South Sudan) have to strengthen their own capacity to bargain and negotiate. There is a need for systemic planning.
If you institute a government agency that will serve as a sort of clearing house, that all incoming aid will have to pass through and be channelled through to purposive [sic] ends, then any development agency that is coming in will have to work with them. They will direct you to the part of the country where they have most need.
Apart from location, you also have to clear agencies on the basis of the nature of the project they come in with. It doesn’t help if you have 100 organisations focusing in a single area and in many other areas you don’t have anything happening.
To maximize the advantages of international development, there is a need for this kind of locational and issue-based deconcentration of international development.
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